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A DIFFICULT QUESTION IN DEED: A COST-BENEFIT
FRAMEWORK FOR TITLING PROGRAMS 1
JEAN 0. LANJouw* & PHILIP LEVY**

ABSTRACT

In this Article we explore the potential benefits and costs of a
program to grant title to individuals who are occupying land informally. Only some of these benefits and costs have received careful
empirical consideration in the literature. This Article references
existing studies and draws on findings from original surveys of
urban households in Ecuador. We consider how a titling program
might affect the welfare of landowners and occupants, how it could
alter the functioning of real estate markets, and whether it could
build a community's social capital. Potential benefits must be
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weighed against a range of costs, including those accruing to the
government for implementation of the program, as well as those
perceived by individuals in their efforts to obtain title. There also
may be dynamic implications of a titling program. For example,
these programs can spur further land invasions and render the role
of intermediaries more lucrative. The importance of formal property
rights and of formal legal systems in governing transactions and
land use is of particular interest given that property rights are
frequently assigned the prominent role of a prerequisite to economic
growth.
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INTRODUCTION
Property rights are commonly regarded as a fundamental
underpinning of a capitalist economic system.2 For individuals to
engage in transactions with each other and to undertake investments that spur economic growth, a system must be in place that
establishes the range of transactions that individuals are allowed to
undertake. This Article addresses the role of property rights in
economic systems by considering the transition from an informal
system of property rights to a formal one. Specifically, we consider
the costs and benefits of formalizing the ownership of land that is
informally occupied or has been developed illegally.
Recent studies of economic growth have given a central role to
the institutions governing property rights. A study of growth in
incomes worldwide since 1500 notes that "a cluster of institutions
ensuring secure property rights for a broad cross section of society
... are essential for investment incentives and successful economic
performance."3 In fact, this study argues that it is the propagation
of such institutions that has led previously laggard areas of the
world to the forefront of the world income distribution.4 This point
emphasizes an important policy question: Are there significant
social benefits to be obtained by extending formal systems of
property rights into new areas? The well-known Peruvian advocate
Hernando de Soto argues that there are in fact significant social
benefits gained by such extension.' His central thesis is that by
clarifying the ownership of property and simplifying the regulations
that govern its use, it is possible to unleash the great potential of
the developing world.'

2. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The PropertyRights Paradigm,33 J.
ECON. HisT. 16, 16 (1973); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofPropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 362 (1967).
3. Daron Acemoglu et al., Reversal of Fortune:Geography and Institutionsin the Making
of the Modern World Income Distribution,117 Q. J. ECON. 1231, 1235 (2002).
4. Id. at 1235-37.
5. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS INTHE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 46-62 (2000).
6. Id.
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The extent of informality is impressive. In most urban areas of
developing countries "in Asia, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa
and the Arab States, between 25 and 70 per cent of the urban population is living in irregular settlements."7 De Soto also estimates
that as many as 85% of urban parcels of land in the developing
world are informal.' Of course, it is the least well-off members of
society who are most likely to occupy the marginal lots. In almost all
cases, in fact, information on urban housing and tenure security
indicates that the situation of the poor has worsened over time.9
To be concrete about the type of situation under consideration,
imagine a parcel of unoccupied urban land in a developing country.
The land in question is owned by the state. Now imagine an entrepreneurial organizer gathering up some poor compatriots from the
countryside and moving in to occupy this parcel of land. This
occupation may be accomplished quite systematically, with the land
subdivided among the new occupants and boundaries clearly settled.
It may be with either the tacit or direct approval of a local politician
and there may be payments made from the new occupants to the
organizer and the politician. Thus, the result is a settlement of poor
individuals residing and perhaps also working on the property.' °
Subsequently, these new settlers will face a series of critical
decisions. They must decide whether to invest in their own property
and whether to participate in communal efforts to address neighborhood concerns. For any investment, they may need to assess how
they might obtain credit. They must determine how much effort to
exert to protect their land from other claimants. Finally, they may
need to decide whether they can safely rent or sell their property.
7. Alain Durand-Lasserve & Lauren Royston, International Trends and Country
Contexts-From Tenure Regularization to Tenure Security, in HOLDING THEIR GROUND:
SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 3 (Alain DurandLasserve & Lauren Royston eds., 2002) thereinafter HOLDING THEIR GROUND].
8. See DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 36. Given the nature of informality in property
ownership arrangements, it is unsurprising that these estimates should vary. De Soto's
organization is one of the few that has worked systematically to document the extent of
informal property holdings.
9. See Durand-Lasserve & Royston, supra note 7, at 3.
10. For a specific example, Solomon Berjamin gives a detailed account of the settlement
of unauthorized colonies in and around Delhi, India. See SOLOMON J. BENJAMIN, JOBS, LAND,
AND URBAN DEVEwPMENr'r

DELHI, INDIA 9 (1992).

THE ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF SMALL MANUFACTURERS IN EASr
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The resolution of these issues is likely to differ under a formal
and an informal system of property ownership. Although the costbenefit framework we develop in this Article will not provide a
final answer to the question of whether moving towards formalization is worthwhile, we will describe the potential gains or losses to
different members of the society and discuss empirical evidence
regarding the magnitude of these impacts. Assessing the empirical
balance between the costs and benefits of property ownership is
essential for determining the advisability of undertaking formal
titling programs.

Due to their prevalence throughout the developing world, land
invasions and informal systems of land tenure have been the focus
of considerable research." This growing body of work includes
examples from many countries. 2 In this study, we draw extensively
on surveys that we fielded in Guayaquil and Quito, Ecuador," as
well as discuss these other important studies.
Part I of this Article describes the ways in which landholdings
may be informal and describes a formalization program. Part II lays
out the theoretical benefits and costs of a land titling program. Part
11. Several previous studies provide useful reviews of the issues and case study evidence.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY PAYNE, CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING,
INFORMAL HOUSING AND LAND SUBDISIONS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 30-34 (1989) [hereinafter PAYNE, INFORMAL HOUSING]; GEOFFREY PAYNE, URBAN
LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW 15 (1997)
[hereinafter PAYNE, URBAN LAND TENURE]. Catherine Farvacque and Patrick McAuslan
discuss the political and legal aspects of land tenure policy, the role of intermediaries in the
process of land invasion, and the overlay of customary and formal systems. See CATHERINE
FARVACQUE & PATRICK McAuSLAN, THE WORLD BANK, REFORMING URBAN LAND POLICIES AND
INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6-29,36-54 (Urban Mgmt. Program, Policy Paper No.
5, 1992).
12. Specifically, studies on this topic include evaluations of the issues and evidence in
rural Africa. See JEAN-PHILIPPE PLATTEAU, INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 134-89 (Kaushik Basu ed., 2000). In addition, the relevant research
encompasses an interesting and detailed description of irregular land acquisition in three
cities: Mexico City, Mexico; Valencia, Venezuela; and BogotA, Colombia. At the time of this
subsequent survey work, each city was estimated to have more than forty percent of its
inhabitants living in irregular settlements, but with considerably different patterns of access
through illegal subdivisions and invasion. Significantly, these studies emphasize the role of
politicians in determining whether invasion is a common form of land redistribution and
discuss in detail the political aspects of infrastructure development. See ALAN GILBERT &
PETER M. WARD, HOUSING, THE STATE, AND THE POOR 1-2 (1985).
13. Jean 0. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formaland Informal Property
Rights in Urban Ecuador,112 ECON. J. 986, 990 (2002).
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III describes a number of estimation issues that commonly arise
when researchers attempt to quantify the benefits and costs of land
titling. Part IV discusses our prior surveys drawn from Ecuador.1 4
Parts V through XIII each address a potential effect of formalizing
property rights. Whenever possible, these Parts begin with evidence
drawn from our Ecuadorian study and progress to empirical
evidence drawn from other research. Part V begins quantifying
the costs and benefits of formal property rights with evidence
regarding the tenure security experienced by landholders with
different sources of rights. Part VI assesses the extent to which
people can undertake property transactions in the presence or
absence of formal title. Parts VII and VIII consider the effects of
formal land titles on private and social investment, respectively. In
Part IX, we review studies concerning the extent to which formalization of property rights facilitates access to formal credit markets.
Part X briefly describes the relationship between formalization and
property taxes to finance infrastructure. In Part XI, we provide
estimates of titling costs. Part XII discusses empirical work relating
to some of the dynamic and distributional questions surrounding a
titling program. Finally, Part XIII offers regression analyses of the
impact of titling on property values.

I. TYPES OF INFORMALITY AND A FORMALIZATION PROGRAM
A. IrregularSettlements
Settlements may be "irregular" or "informal" for a variety of
reasons. Irregular settlements include public or private land settled by squatters, illegal constructions on legal property, and land
developments that are unauthorized either because the development
would have been legal but permits were not obtained, or because the
development does not conform with zoning, minimum infrastructure, or other requirements. 5 Thus, while some forms of irregular

14. See generally id.
15. These forms are not mutually exclusive. For example, studies note the presence of
squatters on land owned by others in an area that had been subdivided and developed
illegally. See BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at ii.
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settlements may be completely illegal, others have attributes of
16
legality.
The settlements that receive the most public attention are the
closely planned and highly organized overnight invasions involving
hundreds of families. Many squatter settlements, however, develop
gradually, one household at a time, as encroachments on otherwise
legally developed neighborhoods. 7 The most common form of these
irregular settlements are unauthorized land developments, which
are often found on private agricultural land on the periphery of
18
cities.
B. Formal Titling Programs
In light of these unique phenomena, "formalizing property rights"
may have many meanings, and may represent a more or less
significant change, depending on the initial circumstances.
The range and complexity of tenure systems ...
demonstrates
that it is simplistic to think of tenure in black and white terms
of legal or illegal, since there is generally a continuum of tenure
categories within most land and housing markets. In many
countries, there may even be more than one legally acceptable
system operating ....
The coexistence of these different tenure
systems and submarkets within most cities creates a complex
series of relationships ....
.9
Although the transfer of property to squatters is often referred to
casually as "titling," land is legally titled once state lands are
privatized. Thus, if an invasion occurs on private property and the
squatters are then regularized, the land is not being "titled." Rather,
title is being transferred from one person to another, ° although
16. See Durand-Lasserve & Royston, supra note 7, at 4-5.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 12 (first alteration in original) (quoting Geoffrey Payne, Urban Land Tenure
Policy Options: Titles or Rights?, Paper Presented at the International Research Group on
Law and Urban Space/Centre for Applied Legal Studies Workshop on Facing the Paradox:
Redefining Property in the Age of Liberalizationand Privatisation(July 29-30, 1999)).
20. Deniz Baharoglu, The World Bank, World Bank Experience in Land Management &
The Debate on Tenure Security 8 (July 2002) (unpublished draft report, available at
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titles do not necessarily have to be issued only to individuals. A
study of land rights policy and indigenous peoples, for example,
indicates that the concept of communal land titles is well recognized
in Latin America.2 '
Title registration guarantees all rights shown in the land register
and represents the highest level of formalization.2 2 Registration
occurs when ownership of the title deed is registered with the state.
This step helps avoid overlapping claims and when done well can
give confidence to potential buyers or lenders as to who actually
owns a piece of land.
There are two main systems of title registration. Land recordation
involves the registration of deeds. Under this system, transactions
are recorded as they occur to keep an accurate historical picture of
transfers related to each plot.2" In contrast, the Torrens system
involves the registration of title. This system provides a current
record of parcel ownership with a State guarantee of registry
information. 4 People can (and do) transfer their property or receive
formal legal titles without registering the transactions. Accordingly,
maintaining registry information has proven to be very difficult and
expensive in developing countries.25
The most extensive and well-known example of an urban property
titling and registration effort in a developing country has taken
place in Peru. 6 In the late 1980s and early 1990s Hernando de
Soto's nongovernmental organization, the Institute for Liberty and
Democracy, ran a pilot project in Peru.2 1 Part of this effort established a new property registry in 1988 called the Registro Praedial

http://www.worldbank.org/urbar/publicat/land-final.pdf).
21. ROGER PLANT & SOREN HVALKOF, LAND TITLING AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 23 (InterAm. Dev. Bank Sustainable Dev. Dep't, Technical Paper Series No. IND-109, 2001).
22. In developing countries, setting up registration systems involves a series of costs and
benefits. See Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing Countries,
13 AM. U. INTL L. REv. 647, 650-51 (1998).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 665.
26. Reform efforts there have been championed by Hernando de Soto, who brought the
problems of costly and bureaucratic land tenure systems to the attention of the wider world
in his 1989 book The Other Path, and more recently in his 2000 book, The Mystery of Capital.
27. See HERNANDO DE S07, THE OTHER PATH: THE INvismiE REVOLUrION IN THE THIRD
WORLD 12-15 (1989).
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to work parallel to the existing registry.2 8 This registry has since
operated with simple and standardized procedures to register titled
properties, which allows the time for the processing of transactions
to be reduced to just one week.29 The new registry neither requires
the use of notaries, a change that substantially reduces the cost to
property owners,3 ° nor does it require proof of property tax payment
as a prerequisite for registration-a feature that has encouraged
greater participation by households.3 1
In 1996, the Peruvian government set up the Comisi6n de
Formalizaci6nde la PropriedadInformal (COFOPRI), an independent organization under the Ministry of the Presidency charged with
verifying the legality and physicality of informal settlements,
issuing titles, and working with the Registro Praedial for the
registration of those titles.32 The program targeted eight major cities
and was supported by a $38 million loan from the World Bank,33
with an additional $19 million to come from the Peruvian national
budget.3 4 The program claims to have issued over one million
property titles by the end of 2000, 3 and thus the program has been
effective in reaching many households relatively quickly, 36 although
its success is due in part to the fact that it has avoided difficult
areas with unclear tenure, conflicts, or invasion on private land. 7

28. See SUSANA LASTARRIA-CORNHIEL & GRENVILLE BARNES, FORMALIZING INFORMALITY:

THE PRAEDIAL REGISTRATION SYSTEM IN PERU 1-2 (Land Tenure Ctr. Research Paper No. 131,
1999).
29. Id. at 29.
30. Id. at 31.
31. Id. at 47.
32. Ayako Kagawa & Jan Turkstra, The Processof Urban Land Tenure Formalizationin
Peru, in LAND, RIGHTS AND INNOVATION: IMPROVING TENURE SECURITY FOR THE URBAN POOR

57, 63-64 (Geoffrey Payne ed., 2002) [hereinafter LAND, RIGHTS AND INNOVATION].
33. Id.
34. Id. at 64.
35. Id. at 65; see also POVERTY REDUCTION & ECON. MGMT. UNIT, WORLD BANK, PROJECT
APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US $38 MILLION EQUIVALENT

TO THE REPUBLIC OF PERU FOR AN URBAN PROPERTY RIGHTS PROJECT, No. 18245 PE, at 8
(1998), available at http'J/www-wds.worldbank.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter
PERU PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT].

36. See Kagawa & Turkstra, supra note 32, at 65.
37. One of the unusual aspects of the COFOPRI program is that the properties have been
transferred to beneficiaries with no charge for the land itself (although there may be some
costs associated with the process, such as surveying).
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The operational cost to the Peruvian government of its nationwide
titling program is estimated to be $66 per title, of which twenty
percent is recovered from recipients in the form of tax revenue and
user fees."8
II. THEORETICAL: BENEFITS AND COSTS
At first blush, it might seem that the formalization of property
ownership would be indisputably beneficial. Legal formalization
would seem to confer upon the property holder the highest possible
level of tenure security, which should be valuable to the owner.3 9
Further, by removing uncertainty about the holder's claim to the
property, formalization should allow the holder to engage in the full
range of behaviors we associate with ownership, such as sale, rental,
use as collateral, and upgrading investments. While these benefits
may all pertain to formalization, this Part points to important
subtleties, which should be considered when assessing the magnitude of the benefits and the associated costs of formalization.
A. Benefits of FormalizingProperty Ownership
We begin with the most straightforward case. Consider a community in which all properties are owned by households having
legal title, except for one irregular plot inhabited by a squatter
household (Base Case). Let us also assume that the squatter's
property is formally owned by the state, that other land-related
markets function perfectly, and that the government is capable of
committing that it will undertake enforcement actions in the future
despite precedent to the contrary. 4° Would it be good public policy to
grant title to the occupant of the untitled property? There are a
number of potential benefits that we can enumerate. Because all
other community members have formal title, it is unlikely that an
38. See PERU PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 35, at 28-29.
39. Note that, throughout this section, unless otherwise specified, the "owner" means the
current occupant of the property. In our cases of interest, this person is likely to be distinct
from the person who holds formal legal rights to the property.
40. We return to the commitment point in dynamic considerations below. Briefly, the
concern is that rewarding those who squat or invade land with formal title could encourage
further squats and invasions in the future unless the government can commit to a policy of
zero tolerance.
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effective informal system of rights enforcement is available to the
solitary extralegal squatter. Pieces of land or the entire property
could be claimed by other family members, community members, a
land invader, or the state, and the squatter would be vulnerable to
these claims.4 ' It follows that the squatter household likely would
experience substantially enhanced security if it were titled like its
neighbors. The value of enhanced security is also likely to increase
with property values in the community. 4 Among the benefits of
increased security, therefore, would be the release of time or money
otherwise devoted to defending the property.43
By allowing participation in the formal system, the formal title
would also permit the occupant to sell the property more easily.
Although there is considerable evidence that land transactions can
occur in informal settings," the formalization ofproperty rights may
improve the functioning of existing markets. 45 This is not because
formal rights are stronger, but rather because formal rights are
easily transferable.46 In fact, elsewhere we have emphasized that
having stronger rights that are nontransferable may make it
more difficult for a household to engage in property transactions.4 v
Because a household can neither convey such rights to a buyer, nor
41. See, e.g., Omar M. Razzaz, Examining Property Rights and Investment in Informal
Settlements: The Case of Jordan,69 LAND ECON. 341, 344 (1993). Razzaz relates how tribal
peoples on the outskirts of Amman, Jordan sold untitled property on the basis of a document
called a "hujia (proof)." Id. In these documents, the seller differentiates between various
threats and agrees to protect the buyer from encroachments or invasions by other members
of the community or tribe, but explicitly mentions that the seller is not responsible for any
actions by the state. Id.
42. For an empirical study of the timing of the settlement of the Brazil frontier, see LEE
J. ALSTON ET AL., TITLES, CONFLICT, AND LAND USE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

AND LAND REFORM ON THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON FRONTIER 109-10, 127 (1999). See also Gershon
Feder, Land Ownership Securityand FarmProductivity:Evidence From Thailand, 24 J. DEV.
STUD. 16, 26-27 (1987) (discussing the increase in productivity caused by enhanced security
in Thailand).
43. See ERICA FIELD, ENTITLED TO WORK: URBAN PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LABOR SUPPLY IN
PERU 2 (Princeton Univ. Research Program in Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 220, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). Field argues that titling could have important
employment effects in Peru, since she finds squatters devoting significant amounts of labor
to protecting their properties. For further discussion, see infra Part V.B.
44. See, e.g., PAYNE, URBAN LAND TENURE, supra note 11, at 3-10; Durand-Lasserve &
Royston, supra note 7, at 4-5; Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 19.
45. See DE SOTO, supranote 5, at 47.
46. See Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 13, at 1004-08.
47. Id.
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credibly commit that the household will not reassert its ownership
after a "sale," potential buyers may face great contract uncertainty
when transacting with households with strong nontransferable
rights. Note, however, that the same feature has the converse effect
in the rental market.4 Having strong nontransferable rights may
improve a household's ability to rent by lowering the likelihood that
difficulties are encountered when trying to reclaim property from a
renter. Whether renting or selling, however, uncertainty seems
more of an impediment when transacting with strangers.
Formalizing property clarifies the boundaries of the property,
validates ownership rights, and makes rights in the property
transferable with the transfer of a title deed.49 All of these features
should facilitate transactions. For an owner, the higher price obtained through a formal sale (compared to an informal sale) would
be one obvious benefit of titling, as would the mobility that comes
with the ability to rent. 50
In assessing the benefit of improved sale and rental markets, one
can draw from general economic ideas of allocative efficiency.
Assuming that we can assess the value of each piece of property
to each individual, let us consider one property and two individuals.
If individual A values the property at $11,000 and individual B
values the property at $9000, a sale of the property from B to A
should benefit each because there is a $2000 surplus that can be
split between them.5 If something were to prevent the transaction-such as the informal nature of property rights-this forgone
surplus would represent a cost of the informal system.
Even if the owner had no wish to leave the property so that, in
this instance, there would be no benefit from reallocation, we might
see an increase in investment activity, both for private benefit and
48. Id. at 1008.
49. In a survey of intermediaries, the double sale of the same piece of property by
customary authorities was given as the most serious among ten problems in the urban land
market of Accra, Ghana. ADARKWAH ANTwi, A STUDY OF INFORMAL LAND TRANSACTIONS IN

ACcRA, GHANA 11 (RICS Found., Our Common Estate Paper Series, 2002), available at
http/www.rics-foundation.org (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
50. Here we are considering a single property as an example. To the extent that many
properties are simultaneously able to transact, we would expect a thicker market to function
more efficiently and provide the benefit of enhanced mobility to the broader community.
51. Of course, B would then need somewhere else to live. Presumably, this was factored
into the $9000 valuation.
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for investment in the broader community. For both types of investment, greater security should increase the landholder's expected
flow of benefits from activity undertaken because he anticipates
controlling the property and being in the community long enough to
enjoy those benefits.52
The degree to which reaping the returns on investments relies
upon ownership security depends, in part, on how investments are
treated in situations of involuntary transfer. Espen Sjaastad and
Daniel Bromley argue that the loss of investment and the loss of use
or ownership are not necessarily linked.5 3 In traditional systems,
when land is taken away from a household, compensation is often
given for investments made by the expropriated household. 4
Sjaastad and Bromley point out that this form of compensation
is also common practice in ownership disputes in most Western
countries.5 5 For instance, Lee Alston and his colleagues explain that
squatters in Brazil receive compensation for land improvements if
they are evicted.56 This sort of compensation would seem much more
likely for private investments on the property than for investment
of time and money in broader public works. Thus, we might expect
the security of title to have a greater effect on social investment
than on private investment. One offsetting consideration, however,
concerns the extent to which investment in an informal property
helps the occupant lay claim to a property. In this context, the
formalization of a property could actually decrease the incentive
to invest. It is not obvious that a decrease in investment with
formalization is necessarily undesirable, however. To illustrate this,
suppose there were a social convention that occupants with ugly
lawn ornaments were the rightful holders of the property. One
might see a great deal of time and effort put into the installation of
such ornaments which had little other value to the property holder.
In such a case, formalization could decrease investment (one would
52. Jean-Phillipe Platteau describes this as the "assurance effect"--an increased
likelihood of seeing future gains. He distinguishes it from a "realisability effect"-the benefit
of a broader market means investment values can be more fully captured in sale values.
PLA'rTEAU, supra note 12, at 131-32.
53. Espen Sjaastad & Daniel W. Bromley,IndigenousLandRights in Sub-SaharanAfrica:
Appropriation,Security and Investment Demand, 25 WoRLD DEV. 549, 553 (1997).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. ALSTON ETAL., supra note 42, at 88.
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no longer need the ornament) but increase the occupant's wellbeing.
Continuing with the simple Base Case, there are other benefits
to consider. With formalization, the newly titled landholder could
participate directly in the formal service markets associated with
property, including basic utilities such as water and electricity. Such
services are often denied to untitled landholders, forcing them to
rely upon less efficient and unsafe modes of delivery. For example,
irregular settlements often purchase water delivered by tanker
trucks and illegally tap into the electricity grid. Once titled, the
property could be included more easily in the tax system-a cost to
the landholder, but a benefit to the state.
A final, potentially important benefit is that formalization of
property may allow the occupant to obtain loans from formal credit
institutions. An untitled property owner typically would have access
to informal sources of credit (e.g., friends, family, and local moneylenders). However, having a titled property to offer as collateral
might make him better able to obtain formal loans with lower
interest rates.57 Better access to credit and at lower cost could
facilitate investments of all sorts. There is one important caveat to
the benefit of credit access, however: If the government is subsidizing credit, the expansion of borrowing with formalization will
increase the distortion associated with the subsidies.58
B. Cost of FormalizingProperty Ownership
Against these benefits would be the cost of granting formal title.
In economic terms, the relevant costs are the additional labor
and materials devoted to surveying the area, the production and
recording of the title, and the legal adjudication of disputes over
property. In the presence of an existing system, these would be
57. There is a large body of literature examining interest rates in informal and formal
credit markets and the role of credit. See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF RURAL ORGANIZATION:
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY pt. 1 (Karla Hoff et al. eds., 1993).
58. See, e.g., Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 18 box 7. Suppose, for example, that the
government pays 25% of the interest cost of loans. This will expand the number of loan
transactions beyond the socially efficient level. At the margin, borrowers will be undertaking
projects that have a 7.5% rate of return, for example, when the true cost to lenders is 10%. In
general, there is a societal loss on each transaction for which the benefit is less than the cost.
If formalization expands the number of transactions, this societal loss increases.
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minimal. Any costs would accrue to the individual or the state,
depending on the amount the state would charge the landholder for
acquiring the title. 9 Quantifying the magnitudes of these benefits
and costs is challenging, but there seems little doubt that titling the
single household in our Base Case would be beneficial.
The purpose of the Base Case is to contrast it with more complicated and realistic alternative situations. The complications can
come through the relaxation of any of our assumptions. For instance, in an irregular settlement, many, if not all, properties may
be untitled and the implementation of a formal system of property
rights may well replace a preexisting and possibly well-functioning
informal system; benefits may not accrue when accompanying
markets do not function well; there may be multiple, preexisting,
legal owners of the land that has been settled or developed informally, some of whom are private; the government may be unable to
refrain from future titling, thereby encouraging additional squatting. We consider each of these possibilities.
1. PreexistingInformal Systems
We begin with the likelihood that the introduction of a formal
system will replace an existing informal system of property rights.
A recurring theme in the literature emphasizes that tenure security
does not require individual freehold titles. It has further been noted
that holding property titles may not be sufficient to deliver security.
Lee Alston and his colleagues also emphasize the political aspect of
property rights: Both the assignment of rights and their effective
enforcement are critical to ensuring legal security of ownership.6'
They point to the Brazilian constitutional provision that land must
be put to beneficial use as a source of insecurity even for those who
have legal title.6 Knowing this provision, Brazilian squatters invade
titled property in an attempt to expropriate land on the basis of
underutilization, especially undeveloped forests.62
Ann Varley discusses a variety of ways that tenure security may
be enhanced that do not involve legalization, drawing from case
59.
60.
61.
62.

Efficiency would argue for charging the true marginal cost.
See ALSTON ETAL., supra note 42, at 17.
See id.
See id. at 17, 20.
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studies from a variety of countries.6 3 For example, contrary to what
was suggested in our Base Case, connection to public infrastructure
may not require a property to be titled. 4 Provision of infrastructure
connections to properties in an irregular settlement by the government may also provide a strong signal that the authorities have
accepted the settlement and the division of property therein.6 5
This signal may give residents the perception that they have
been regularized. Improvements in infrastructure provided by the
government have often (although not always) been followed by
substantial increases in housing investment.' Tax collection and
the issuance of trading licenses have had a similar effect.67 In
general, what matters are people's convictions about government
intentions, and these can be signaled by the availability of services,
issuance of certificates, public statements of intent, and the passage
of time.'
Not only may there be other ways to increase tenure security
besides formally titling residents of irregular settlements, but also
the process of introducing a formal title system in an area may
actually increase uncertainty. 9 In particular, if one takes an area
with a long-standing and well-understood customary property rights
system and overlays a formal state titling program, it can make
residents less secure because they are unsure which system will
apply in any given situation. There are other considerations that
arise related to the process of change from one system to another.
Violent conflict can result from uncertainty about how the government will view the claims of owners versus squatters. 0 In a study
of property rights and indigenous groups, Roger Plant and Soren
Hvalkof point out that a titling process that individualizes rights
may damage both culture and governance in groups previously
organized along more collective lines.7
63. See Ann Varley, The Relationship Between Tenure Legalization and Housing
Improvements: Evidence From Mexico City, 18 DEv. & CHANGE 463, 465-69 (1987).
64. See id. at 466-67.
65. See id. at 466.
66. See, e.g., id.
67. See id. at 468.
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., PLA rEAU, supra note 12, at 121-82.
70. See ALSTON ET AL., supra note 42, at 17-18.
71. See PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 21, at 4.
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2. Poorly FunctioningAccompanying Markets
Another class of complications involves other aspects of the
functioning of markets. Deniz Baharoglu notes that titling may not
improve the functioning of housing markets if other impediments
remain.72 Construction codes, land development, taxes, and sales
regulations can all limit land transactions.7 3
Michael Carter and Pedro Olinto argue that if credit markets do
not function well, then hoped-for investment benefits may not be
realized.74 Further, they argue that evidence of increased landrelated investment may be deceptive.75 If investment associated
with a newly formalized property is merely a shift from other
investments, total investment may not feature a corresponding
increase.7 6 Finally, Geoffrey Payne notes that a small-scale titling
program raises the possibility of market distortions. 77 If there is a
substantial unfulfilled demand for titled properties among the
middle class, one could encourage a boom in land values.7 " This
would seem desirable from the perspective of landholders, but
others have argued that such speculation works to the disadvantage
of the poor.7 9 Further, distributional arguments along these lines
would require a careful understanding of the wealth of existing
landholders, newcomers to the booming market, and renters (who
would certainly seem to lose from higher values and who were the
poorest group in our Ecuador survey described below).
3. PreexistingOwnership
In our Base Case, we ignored the problem of preexisting ownership. In practice, the benefit to the occupant of increased security
72. See Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 26-27.
73. See id.
74. Michael R. Carter & Pedro Olinto, Getting Institutions "Right"for Whom? Credit
Constraintsand the Impact of PropertyRights on the Quantityand Composition ofInvestment,
85 Am. J. AGRIc. ECON. 173, 174 (2003).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See PAYNE, URBAN LAND TENuRE, supra note 11, at 24-25.
78. See id.
79. Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 27.
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would be matched by the loss to the previous owner of the possibility
of reclamation. Whether this nullifies the benefits of enhanced
security depends on the relative weights one assigns to the wellbeing of past and present owners.80 The question of whether the
newly formalized occupant or a third party would need to offer
compensation to the previous owner clearly affects the distribution
of benefits. The calculus may become further complicated when
third parties become involved and capture some of the benefits of a
land invasion. The authors previously have presented evidence of
payments to organizers in Ecuador."l Such organizers may recruit
invaders and may be allied with government officials who provide
political cover. 2 The extent to which the gains from formalization
are captured by the land occupants or by the organizer would depend on the magnitude of the payments required and the extent to
which any payments are for services provided."
4. Insufficient Government Resources
Our Base Case assumed a small-scale program. Costs may differ
with a broader titling effort. On the one hand, there could be
economies of scale-lower per-property costs-where surveyors
take on whole neighborhoods and clerks develop the requisite
skills for processing deeds. On the other hand, a larger program
would require a sustained political commitment and a degree of administrative resources that may be difficult to commit. Most projects
call for cost recovery through fees, but this is rarely achieved. 4
A final complication concerns the dynamic effects of a titling
program. Our initial example considered a case in which the state
would not repeat its actions. In fact, the willingness of a state to
80. A related issue of particular relevance in rural areas is the fact that formalization may
bundle together rights previously spread across a number of individuals (e.g., rights to use,
rights to sell). Thus, greater security for the title holder may mean greater insecurity for those
who previously had some claims on the land under an informal system. See PLATrEAU, supra
note 12, for examples.
81. See Lanjouw & Levy, supranote 13, at 992.
82. See id. at 992 n.8.
83. See id. at 1013.
84. See CITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: INTEGRATION OF IRREGULAR SETrLEMENTS:

CURRENT QUESTIONS IN ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA 18-22 (Valerie Clerc et al. eds., Simone
Castro Alves et al. trans.) (Pratiques Urbaines No. 12, 1995) [hereinafter CITIES].
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legitimize a land invasion will be considered when other individuals
are deciding whether to invade land. Not only might faster and
cheaper titling encourage repeat squatting or more migration from
the countryside, it also signals to landowners that they may gain by
illegally subdividing their land.' Thus, one must consider not only
the costs and benefits of an existing land transfer, but also the
encouragement of future invasions, which may lead to further
transfers or even to conflict.
In general, we might think that such land invasions are a bad
way to settle property. Often invasions occur in marginal areas
where the provision of services may be more costly and where
conditions are poor or even dangerous; and it is always more
difficult to put in infrastructure after housing has been built.
A preference for a more organized disposition of land underlies
most systems of zoning and housing regulation. It is not clear
whether allowing urban land development through a process of
irregular settlement or through a process of planned public housing
is more beneficial for the poor. While public housing would seem to
overcome the infrastructure issues and conflicts described above, in
practice it often has been too expensive for the poorest members of
society. An advantage of irregular settlements is that they are able
to begin with the smallest of investments and build up over time.
In the next Part, we describe empirical research that quantifies
some of these effects.
III. EMPIRICAL ISSUES

In this Part we consider some empirical studies that provide
evidence regarding the various costs and benefits of title that were
outlined in the previous Part. Before beginning, however, we briefly
discuss some basic statistical problems and issues of interpretation
that arise in this context.
An important statistical concern is the so-called "endogeneity"
problem. Suppose, for example, that one is interested in the relationship between security and title status. An endogeneity problem
arises when both a household's degree of security and its title status
are related to some household or community characteristic that is
85. See LAND, RIGHTs AND

INNOVATION,

supra note

32, at 5-6.
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not observed in the data. For instance, it may be that some
households have a characteristic that makes them particularly
vulnerable to being pushed off their property by neighbors-but we
do not have the information that would tell us which households
these are. It may also be that the more vulnerable households make
an effort to obtain title because they stand to gain more from having
legal support for their property claims. If so, a direct analysis of the
data would underestimate the positive association between title and
security because it is exactly the most insecure households that
have chosen to obtain title. Thus, the quantitative effect of titling
estimated from the data would not reflect the actual effect that title
would have if a randomly selected group of households were to be
given title.
To give a concrete example, suppose that at some initial period
there are two groups of households with untitled properties. One
group has a security level of one and the other group has a higher
security level of two. Because the first group feels particularly
vulnerable they obtain title, which has the huge benefit of doubling
their security level to two. If at this point one were to analyze, on
the basis of these two groups, whether having title to property
enhanced security, one would mistakenly conclude that title had
exactly no effect because both the titled and untitled households had
the same ex post security level of two.
Endogeneity is a particular concern in this context because often
households influence whether they have title, even if they do not
have complete control of the titling process. This makes it likely that
title status is at least partially related to important, and unobserved, characteristics of the household, its property or the larger
community. Endogeneity can be a concern in the analysis of many
of the roles of property rights, beyond their role in improving
security. For example, households with better investment opportunities may be more likely to obtain title because stronger property
rights complement their investment activities. If so, an analysis of
household investment and title would tend to overstate the benefit
of title, since higher investment among the titled group could result
not just from the fact that being titled has increased the returns on
investment, but also from the fact that the group of titled households had more productive investment opportunities initially.
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Endogeneity also may be a concern with other variables used in
the analysis that are related to claims over property. For example,
the length of time that an untitled resident has lived in a neighborhood is a variable that one might expect to be related to unobserved
characteristics of that neighborhood (e.g., social cohesiveness) that
are, in turn, related to security and investment.
As is clear from the examples, if one fails to deal with this
statistical issue, estimates of.the effects of formalization could be
quite misleading with biases going in positive or negative directions.
In the studies discussed below, the authors have taken a variety of
approaches to avoid endogeneity problems. We note these as the
evidence is presented.
A second empirical issue--one that is often raised in studies of
property rights and investment-is termed "reverse causation." The
basic observation is that when a household invests in a property,
it often serves to bolster the household's ownership claims in the
eyes of the community or government. This recognition then makes
it easier for the household to obtain formal rights over the property.
Thus, one might find a strong positive relationship between investment and legal rights, but it would be investment "causing" the
rights rather than the fact of more secure rights encouraging
investment. Again, authors have dealt with this issue in various
ways and we note them below.
A third issue is raised by the use of hypothetical or perceptionbased questions. We use such questions, for example, as a way to
avoid endogeneity. Ideally one would like to avoid endogeneity
by observing households where one randomly selected group has
been allocated formal property rights and another group has not
(i.e., where there is no choice element on the part of either the
households or the government). However, this is not usually
possible given the way in which titling proceeds. The alternative
approach used in our study of Ecuador is to ask the same households hypothetical questions about their property with or without
title. This raises the question of how to interpret the responses to
questions about perceptions and expectations. Several of the studies
discussed below, in addition to ours in Ecuador, use responses to
this form of questioning to obtain insights about the use of property.
Such responses are admittedly subjective, which raises a concern
about noise in the data (i.e., that the responses are not very
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accurate) and the potential for bias as compared to other recorded
information. A drawback of having noise in the data is that it may
make it difficult to detect relationships that are actually there. If,
in spite of this, statistically significant relationships are found, then
the fact that there may be noise is of less concern.
Potential biases introduced by asking perception questions may
or may not be an issue. On the one hand, there may be a problem if
respondents intentionally misrepresent their views. This might be
a concern, for example, if the surveying organization looks to
respondents as a potential source of funding or other advantage. It
should be acknowledged, however, that misrepresentation is also a
problem confronted when collecting any sensitive "objective" data
(e.g., income).
If respondents are not being deceptive, the potential for bias must
be considered in the light of what one wants to know. It is not at all
obvious that information about households' perceptions should be
considered weaker than more objective data. When analyzing the
effect of different types of ownership claims on security, for example,
if perceived security differs systematically from actual security, it
is perceptions that give the better variable for understanding
households' sense of well-being-their "utility."' The true ability of
a household to transact in the market will be influenced by that
household's perceptions, in that a pessimistic household may not
even enter the market. Expectations regarding property values may
give a better indication of the utility that households obtain from
their properties than actual property values, particularly for the
many survey households that have no intention of entering the
market.

86. Others have raised this point in the particular context of household security. William
Doebele argued that tenure security is a matter of perception rather than a legal category. See
William Doebele, Concepts of Urban Land Tenure, in URBAN LAND PoLIcy: IssuEs AND
OPPoaruNrrIEs 63 (H. B. Dunkerly ed., 1978). Following this line of argument, Leland Burns
and Donald Shoup use residents' stated feelings of security, rather than objective criteria, to
examine the effect of tenure security on housing investment. Leland S. Burns & Donald C.
Shoup, Effects of Resident Control and Ownership in Self-Help Housing,57 LAND ECON. 106,
108-09 (1981).
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IV. OUR ECUADOR CASE STUDY

With the aim of estimating some of the effects of different sources
of land ownership claims, including legal title, we designed and
fielded household and community surveys in Guayaquil and Quito,
Ecuador's two largest urban centers. In 1993,just a few years before
our survey, a property titling program had been initiated in
Guayaquil by the Department of Legalization and the Department
of Land and Parochial Services. According to the Mayor's Office, the
number of titled properties that had been measured and surveyed
five years later was over 180,000, although only a third were "in
process" or titled.87 After interviewing a range of participants in the
city, Blake Rawdin ascribed the delay in issuing titles on the
surveyed properties to the fact that various interest groups, in
particular community bosses but also city politicians, lose power
and patronage as households are titled. 8
We conducted our Guayaquil survey in 1996 and included 1921
individuals in 400 households resident in twenty communities. Our
interest was in both the effects of title and how the role of legal title
depends on other sources of property rights. We thus selected the
communities on the basis of their age and on the basis of the share
of households possessing formal title in order to ensure that we
would encounter variety in property rights arrangements in our
data. 9 The communities selected were poorer than the Guayaquil
average, with monthly per capita consumption of $75 in 1995 as
compared to $143 city-wide. 9 Within the communities, households
were selected randomly.
Households in Guayaquil obtained their property in a number of
ways, as shown in Table 1. Only twenty-two of the households
surveyed purchased their properties with title at the time that they
first occupied the land ("purchasers"). Far more commonly, lowerincome households began their occupancy of public or private land
87. Blake J. Rawdin, Urban Land Invasions and Social Welfare: Guayaquil, Ecuador 57
n.61 (1999) (unpublished Senior Essay, Yale University) (on file with authors).
88. Id. at 58-59.

89. The survey made no distinction as to whether a title was registered.
90. Figures are in 1996 U.S. dollars. The population statistic was based on Encuesta de
Condiciones de Vida, ECV (1995), available at http'/www.worldbank.org/lsms/country/
ecuador/dox/metodox.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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as squatters without title (92% in our sample). Over time, many
proceeded to obtain title. Our designation of a squatter household
as "owning" a property does not imply that it holds title; it simply
reflects the respondents' claim to be the owner. Similarly, our
designation of a household as a squatter household does not imply
that the property remained untitled.
Table 1
Guayaquil: Types of Survey Households
Title Status
Household Type

Total

Titled

Untitled

Unknown

Purchasers
Squatters

23
254

23
112

....
142

--

Non-owners
All Households

123
400

73
208

33
175

17
17

The survey in Quito was fielded in the spring of 1998. We had
less information from the municipality to use in choosing the
communities, so they were selected on the basis of distance from
the city center and income level. Questionnaires were completed by
402 randomly chosen households in twenty communities. There
were some important differences from Guayaquil. First, in this
survey the sampling frame was restricted to owner households.
When a household was found to be renting, it was replaced by a
new, randomly chosen household until an owner was found. Second,
the Quito respondents were, on average, somewhat wealthier, with
a monthly per capita consumption of $134 (1996 U.S. dollars).
Third, only two of the twenty communities were originally settled
via a land invasion and only one of these was settled with the
assistance of an organizer (versus sixteen invaded and nine with an
organizer for Guayaquil). Not surprisingly, given that we had far
fewer invaded areas in the Quito data, a larger percentage (45%) of
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the owners were found to have purchased titled properties directly.
Of the 223 squatting households, 113 were titled at the time of our
survey. Finally, our Quito communities were considerably older
than those in the Guayaquil sample: thirty-eight years versus
twenty-three years.9 Because of the different methods of selecting
communities in Guayaquil and Quito, we are unable to say whether
these differences are representative of the full populations of the
two cities.
The surveys in both cities consisted of several sections. One
section of the household survey was devoted to questions regarding
respondents' tenure security, their ability to make property
transactions, and property values. Another section gathered
detailed information about characteristics of properties and
communities. Other sections were adopted directly from the World
Bank's 1995 Ecuadorian Living Standards Measurement Survey. 92
These provided information on household demographics, wage and
home business income, and household consumption and assets.
Each household was asked to designate a person particularly
knowledgeable about the community. The most frequently identified person was then given a community questionnaire in order to
obtain information about the origin of each community and details
about current characteristics.
Because the survey was purposefully designed, we were able to
address different aspects of property rights in some novel ways.
First, we were able to construct a variety of variables to capture
different sources of informal rights over property. Some of the
variables were at the level of the household. The number of years
that a household had been resident on a property, whether the
household had any adult male members, and whether the household had paid a local boss for its property were variables found to
be particularly important in the subsequent analysis. 93 Other
variables designed to capture sources of informal rights were at the
91. It may be that some of the older communities in Quito were actually settled by
invasions initially. It was so long ago, however, that the community respondent did not know
it, and so long ago that most current residents were purchasers of properties for which the
original squatters or their descendants had obtained title successfully.
92. For a description of the data, see httpJ/www.worldbank.org/Isms (last visited Feb. 4,
2004).
93. See discussion infra Parts V, VI, and VIII.
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community level. Whether the community was founded with the
involvement of an organizer, the percentage of households that paid
a boss for their properties, and the age of the community were
variables found to be empirically important.9 4
In addition to developing variables that captured some elements
of informal rights, we also were able to develop some very specific
variables to measure the breadth of the property market available
to different types of owners and the influence of rights on security
and property values. For example, we distinguished between
households' ability to rent or to sell property to different types of
buyers-whether a family member, someone from inside the
community, or someone from outside the community. We were also
able to ask households to assess the value of their property under
a counterfactual title status (e.g., untitled households estimated the
value of the land with title). This allowed us to address the
statistical problem of endogeneity. These variables are discussed in
more detail in the following Parts.
V. TENURE SECURITY

In this Part we consider evidence regarding the benefit of title in
enhancing households' sense of tenure security.
A. Evidence from Ecuador
The role of title in enhancing ownership claims and the fact that
physical possession can provide an alternative are supported by two
findings in our data from Guayaquil. First, we found titled
properties were more than twice as likely as untitled properties to
be occupied by someone other than the owner. If the physical
presence of the owner is an important alternative to title in
ensuring ownership rights, then this is precisely what one would
expect. Second, only 24% of the non-owners who paid rent occupied
untitled properties, while 37.5% of those who did not pay rent, who
were likely to be relatives or friends of the owner, occupied untitled
properties. Although not statistically significant, this difference
also suggests that owners without title were reluctant to be absent
94. Definitions of variables are found in the Appendix Table A.1, infra.
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from their properties.9 5 If they were going to be absent, they
preferred to "lend" their properties to relatives and friends rather
than to rent them to strangers.
Most of the untitled owners in our survey in Guayaquil claimed
to be making some effort to obtain a title, with all but two giving
improved tenure security as the primary or secondary reason.' To
the extent that these households felt insecure, however, it did not
seem to be due to fears of eviction, at least in the short term. When
those same households were asked their views of the likelihood of
receiving an eviction notice in the coming year, only 22.5% allowed
for any chance of eviction. It thus appears that insecurity must
come from longer-term concerns about eviction or fears of losing
their properties through informal pressure. Poor households also
may be very risk averse, making even a low probability of eviction
a disturbing situation.9 7
While the short-term threat of eviction was judged to be low,
households differed in their willingness to state that eviction was
"impossible." In particular, untitled squatters in a community
founded with an organizer were considerably more likely to view
eviction as "impossible" (83%) than those in a community founded
without an organizer (58%).98 This suggests that organizers are able
to protect squatter communities from government threats. The
benefit of a boss was particularly strong in communities where he
had been paid by a large percentage of the squatters. Untitled
households residing on a property for many years reported more
confidence that eviction was impossible, as did those in communities far from the city center or where the invasion occurred on
publicly owned land.

95. The importance of maintaining a physical presence is particularly important in the
early days of a settlement. Rawdin explains how organizers in Guayaquil sold plots
conditional on a limit on the time it could be left vacant. Rawdin, supra note 87, at 35. If a
household failed to occupy the property within the stipulated time it would revert to the
organizer for resale. Id.
96. This was an open question allowing multiple responses. The most common were to
increase security, to prolong the stay on the property, to avoid being forcibly removed, and to
avoid land being taken by the municipality.
97. This point is formalized in GERSHON FEDER ET AL., LAND POLICIES AND FARM
PRODUCTIVITY IN THAILAND 31, 37, 75-79 (1988).
98. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2
Contributions to the Security of Untitled Squatter
The Likelihood of Eviction

In Community

in the Next Year is:

with an Organizer

Without

Impossible

83.0

58.0

Not Very Probable

13.5

39.0

3.5

3.0

100.0%

100.0%

Other
Respondents

111

31

A household's length of residence is a good candidate for being
endogenous in this estimation and therefore the importance of the
variable has two interpretations. It may be that length of tenure
has a direct effect on security as others in the community increasingly view the household as the legitimate owner of the property
and legal claims are strengthened." It also may be, however, that
length of tenure is associated with an unobserved characteristic of
the community. For example, if the government does not care about
squatters in some parts of the municipality, then it will not evict
them and they will also feel secure."

99. A household may obtain legal rights through adverse possession if it resides on a
parcel of land for a sufficient period of time. For a discussion of this legal doctrine, see JOHN
P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND PoLIcy: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 76-93 (1998).
100. For further discussion of other characteristics affecting tenure security and
econometric results see Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 13, at 999-1011.
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B. Evidence from Elsewhere
The results for Ecuador suggest that, while untitled squatters
feel somewhat vulnerable to eviction or other pressures, they do
have access to some sources of tenure security. These may come at
a high cost, however. For example, untitled squatters were less
willing to rent their homes, suggesting that it might be important
for family members to maintain a physical presence on or near the
property. If using informal means to identify and enforce property
claims requires the investment of time and other resources,
formalizing ownership rights may lower the cost of achieving
security of tenure. 1 ' One would then expect to see titled households
expending fewer resources to maintain ownership and, at the same
time, enjoying a heightened sense of security.
A recent study by Erica Field explored this aspect of formalization in detail.' Field's hypothesis was that untitled households
will keep some of their adult members at home during the day in
order to protect their ownership claims against eviction or invaders.
This, in turn, will cut back on the households' labor income, an
outcome which should be recognized as a cost of enforcing ownership rights when those rights are informal.0 3
Field's study used a 2000 survey of 2750 urban households
resident in the eight target cities of the COFOPRI titling program
in Peru. °' 4 This titling program reached different areas only over
time, so Field was able to compare the labor market behavior of
eligible households in neighborhoods with the program to that of
eligible households in neighborhoods where the program had not
yet arrived at the time of the survey. 1 5 Other differences between
the two groups of neighborhoods-differences not due to the titling
program-are accounted for using households in each group that
one would not expect to be affected by the program because they
101. Of course, it may also be costly for a titled household to take advantage of formal
enforcement mechanisms. We found in Guayaquil that even in our formally settled and titled
communities 15% of respondents named the mediation of a community leader as the primary
mode of dispute resolution.
102. See FIELD, supra note 43.
103. Id. at 2-3.
104. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
105. FIELD, supra note 43, at 14-21.
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were titled before it began.' °6 This variation in timing and across
pre-program title status makes it possible to isolate the change in
labor market behavior that is due to titling rather than other
characteristics.' 7 In other words, this method avoids endogeneity
problems.
The survey suggests that the titling program did succeed in
increasing the perceived security of households.'1 8 When asked
the question, "Do you consider your dwelling currently at risk of
eviction/invasion?" households untitled at the start of COFOPRI
were 25 percentage points more likely to say that they were at
risk than the titled households if they were in neighborhoods that
the program had not yet reached.' 9 In neighborhoods with the
program, however, the difference dropped to just six percentage
points." It should be noted, however, that, just as in Ecuador,
there was a high level of security even among untitled households
in Peru. For example, a baseline survey of residents in 2000 found
that 47% of those with no documents rated themselves as "secure,"
rising to 78% of households with a sales document."' This confirms
other studies that have found high levels of security among untitled
households. For example, in rural Thailand, where evictions by the
government were rare, untitled squatters on government land did
not view security as the most important reason for obtaining a
title."' Rather, access to formal credit was viewed as the main
advantage."'
Field considered three ways in which a desire to protect their
dwellings might limit the labor market activity of untitled households."" The first was a cutback in the total number of labor hours
as members stayed home to guard the property. Field estimated
that soon after titling, a household increased its total labor, on
average, by 16.2 hours per week."' Taking into account a number
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

113.
114.
115.

Id. at 16-18.
Id.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 22, 43, tbl.3b.
Id.
Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 20 box 9.
FEDER ETAL., supra note 97, at 37.
Id.
FIELD, supra note 43, at 3.
Id.
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of ways in which this direct estimate might be understating the
effect of titling, Field gave an adjusted estimate of the longer-term
effect of closer to forty hours per week."' She also found that it was
smaller households that increased their labor hours the most as a
result of having a title and that the biggest change was in male
employment." 7 Male household members, being better able to
protect the home against potential invaders, were freed for work
when protection was no longer necessary."'
One way to earn income and watch a house simultaneously is to
have a home business. Thus, Field considered whether, once titled,
households take advantage of the greater freedom by moving to
employment in better jobs outside the home." 9 Indeed this is what
she found: The probability of owning a home business was almost
50% lower in the program neighborhoods after some time is allowed
for adjustment.uo
Finally, Field noted that if untitled households feel constrained
to keep one or more adults at home, they may also feel compelled
to send children out as income-earners in place of the adults.' 2 ' If
this were so, then one would expect to see a decrease in child labor
among titled households. The data supports this suggestion. The
estimated results suggest that in smaller households, the probability of sending a child out to work is about
28% lower in neighbor1 22
hoods reached by the titling program.
The need to increase informal security may directly engage
labor-that is, beyond maintaining a physical presence. In a survey
on the Brazilian frontier, Lee Alston and his colleagues found that
seventy-one of eighty-eight responding households indicated that
keeping clear the boundaries of their claims was the most important activity in maintaining property claims. Respondents said
that, on average, this activity took about one week per year of
labor. 123
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 27.

Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id.
AISTN ETAL., supra note 42, at 111-12.
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Omar Razzaz gives another example of households investing
labor and other resources to secure informal property rights. He
describes a situation in Amman, Jordan, where tribal people who
were longtime residents of state land located on the outskirts of the
12 4
city were denied title because they never had cultivated the land.
Given a surge in demand for the land coming from the growing
urban population, the tribal people began to subdivide and sell the
property informally. The process led to periods of violent confrontation between the government and the arriving settlers and tribal
inhabitants. During one period when the state was actively
demolishing homes, the criterion used by the government was to
leave intact houses that had a permanent roof.12 Thus, frantic
construction occurred during the government workers' off days so
that new homes could be built of solid materials to the point of
having a roof in a day or two. 2 ' This is also a good example of
housing investment leading to security of tenure rather than the
other way around (i.e., "reverse causation"). Households were able
to reduce their probability of eviction, but at the cost of investing
greater time and resources in their initial home than they may
have chosen to invest otherwise.
While considerable evidence suggests that investment in housing
and an active physical presence help to maintain informal property
claims, their importance varies. For example, Allyson Thirkell, in
a study of informal settlements in Cebu City, the Philippines, found
that 23% of the households acquiring properties in the study areas
and occupying their
waited at least six months before building 1on
28
sites. 127 Six percent waited over two years.

VI. THE ABILITY TO TRANSACT

In this Part we consider how title status affects the ease with
which property may be bought and sold or rented. As discussed in
Part II, potential buyers face greater contract uncertainty when
124. Razzaz, supra note 41, at 343-46.
125. Id. at 346-48.

126. Id. at 348.
127. Allyson J. Thirkell, Players in Urban Informal Land Markets: Who Wins? Who Loses?
A Case Study of Cebu City, 8 ENV'r & URBANIZATION 71, 81 (1996).
128. Id.
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transacting with households that have strong but nontransferable
rights, thus making sales to strangers more difficult. On the other
hand, having strong nontransferable rights may make it easier to
rent by reducing the likelihood that difficulties will be encountered
when trying to reclaim property from a renter. Thus, a differential
effect of nontransferable rights in sale and rental markets can
provide evidence of transaction uncertainty impeding the operation
of property markets in the absence of legal title.
A. Evidence from Ecuador
To investigate this aspect of title, our surveys asked each
property owner several sets of questions regarding his ability to
sell the property or rent the entire house. For example, we asked
whether, the household would be able to sell its property to a
stranger and, if not, whether it would be able to sell to a relative or
friend.129
We first investigate whether transfer uncertainty is important in
this context by looking at two simple relationships in the data from
Guayaquil. If there is no transactions uncertainty, it is as though
every buyer is a friend or family member. In this case, stronger
rights have a symmetric effect on the ability to sell and rent. In
such a setting, one would expect households to respond that they
are either able both to sell and rent, do neither, or if they can do
only one, state consistently the type of transaction that is easiest
in this environment. By contrast, if transactions uncertainty is an
issue, stronger nontransferable rights have opposite effects in
sale and rental markets. On this account, one might expect some
households to respond that they are able to sell but not rent, and
others to state the opposite. We see in Table 3 below that almost a
quarter of our sample households stated that they were able to
transact in only one market, with a statistically significant percentage on each of the off-diagonals. This pattern is consistent with
strong but nontransferable rights creating transfer uncertainty.

129. The questions distinguished between strangers inside versus outside the community.
Households rarely indicated any difference between the two, however, so we reclassified the
responses as either being able to transact with an outsider, family or friends, or no one.

2004]

COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR TITLING PROGRAMS

923

Table 3
Ability to Contract with an Outsider
Percentage of Sample
Can Sell:
Yes

No

Yes

17%

5%

No

16%

62%

Can Rent:

We next begin by assuming that the twenty-six households with
no adult males are less able to assert their ownership claims in
the absence of other authority (i.e., they have relatively low nontransferable rights). If this assumption is correct, and transfer
uncertainty is a concern, we make the following predictions:
Households with no males should find it easier to sell; they are less
secure and as such obtain less benefit from the property themselves
and therefore will sell for a lower price. These households should
have a particularly strong advantage in sales to outside buyers
because, in addition to being less demandingabout price, they also
engender less transfer uncertainty. In our sample, 52% of households without males reported that they would be able to sell their
property to a friend or family member, versus 35% of households
with an adult male. The difference grows to 52% versus 29% when
asked about sales to outsiders. As with sales, households with no
males should find it easier to rent to friends and family, but they
may have more difficulty renting to outsiders. When asked about
rental of the whole house, 38% of households without males said
that they could rent to a friend or family member versus only
30% among households with males. When asked about rental to
outsiders, however, the advantage of female-only households
almost disappears: 21% of female-only households say that it is
possible, versus 19% for households with males. Thus, the pattern
of household responses is consistent with the suggestion that
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transactions uncertainty is a real impediment to households
engaging in land transactions.
In an environment with transactions uncertainty, we expect that
a household with stronger transferable rights over its property
will find it easier both to sell and rent to outsiders. To examine this
hypothesis, we construct a dependent variable that has a value of
one if the household can transfer its rights in any form, either by
renting out the entire house or by selling it, and a value of zero
otherwise. In all, only 38% of the sampled property owners reported
that they would be able to contract with an outside buyer, with an
additional 14% able to contract with a relative or friend.
A probit analysis allows us to control for many features simultaneously. 13 We examine the possible endogeneity of a household's
title status using a two-stage procedure (instrumental variables).
In the first stage, a model of title status is estimated using
variables that are not endogenous, and the title status of each
household is predicted using this model. In the second stage, the
probit model for the ability to transact is estimated using predicted
rather than actual title status.13 ' The results indicate a number
of variables that have a significant influence on the ability to
transact. In particular, the estimates show that the age of the
community in which a household resides, the involvement of a
community organizer when the community was established, and
the possession of a property title are very effective substitutes for
one another. In recently settled communities without an organizer,
for example, having title increases the probability of being able to
transfer by 82 percentage points. Thus, in the absence of title there
appears to be considerable uncertainty about ownership claims in
very new and disorganized neighborhoods. The benefit of title falls
substantially on communities founded through organized invasions:
The involvement of a community organizer lessens the positive
effect of title by 32 percentage points. The benefit of title also falls
130. Standard regression analysis assumes that the dependent variable is continuous. If
it takes on discrete levels, this implies a different distribution of the error term. A probit
analysis controls for this different distribution in the case of a binary dependent variable. One
difference from standard regression analysis is that with a probit, the predicted effects of a
change in an independent variable depend on the values of other independent variables.
131. See Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 13, at 1004-08, 1015, for the full set of probit results
and details. Tests show that endogeneity is not an issue, so the reported results are for the
uninstrumented equation.
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as communities become better established: Title contributes only
half as much (40 percentage points) to a household's ability to
transact once its community is eighteen years old. In sum, it
appears very important to have some source of transferable rights,
but it is not necessary that they be formal.
When investigating nontransferable claims, it becomes important
to distinguish between the ability to sell and the ability to rent, so
we also consider the two types of transactions separately. Consistent with the simpler findings reported above, in probit estimations
that control for many characteristics we find that, among untitled
households, having adult males decreases the likelihood that a
household will be able to sell its property by 45 percentage points.
For these households, having a title is very important in improving
their ability to sell. On the other hand, households with adult males
are more likely to state that they are able to rent. Having title
makes renting even easier for those households, but with rental it
is the female-only households that gain most from having title.
None of the fourteen female-only households without title felt able
to rent its property.
In our controlled estimations we also find that when a titling
program is underway in a community, households are less likely to
say that they can sell their properties (down 10 percentage points)
and far less likely to say that they can rent (down 18 percentage
points). It seems that households do not want to be absent from
their properties when the government is about to allocate formal
claims, a finding that again supports the idea that physical
possession of a property is an important contributor to ownership
rights.
B. Evidence from Elsewhere
A number of other studies point to the problem of transactions
uncertainty. Farmers in Kenya, for example, sometimes "sell their
land to several (stranger) buyers at once or agree to sell" expecting
that after receiving their money the sales will be voided by the
government and they will evade repaying the buyer or buyers." 2
132. PLAWrEAU, supra note 12, at 155. For a detailed discussion of Kenyan transactions
uncertainty, see Parker Shipton, The Kenyan Land Tenure Reform: Misunderstandingsin the
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Solomon Benjamin notes that developers of unauthorized colonies
in Delhi often sell plots to more than one family.'33 In informal
urban settlements in Cebu City, the Philippines, Allyson Thirkell
finds land payment patterns that are consistent both with the idea
that physical occupation is a strong symbol of ownership, and that
these informal rights can create uncertainty regarding transactions
in land.' From interviews with 128 households that had purchased land, Thirkell finds that 83% had been required to pay the
full price in cash when the property was transferred from the plot35
seller. Only 9% had been allowed to make multiple payments.
This, she suggests, is due to concerns about enforcing payment once
136
the buyer is in place.

On the other hand, a study of payment terms in 149 settlements
in Bogota, Colombia, found a standard payment pattern of onethird down with the balance paid in monthly installments over
three years.13 The data indicates that 30% of purchasers of plots
in so-called "pirate subdivisions" fall behind in their payments, but
this is often a purposeful response to delay by subdividers in
providing promised services rather than a refusal to pay."'
Many studies of land markets in irregular settlements find
that plots are bought, sold, and rented, irrespective of their legal
status. 139 Roger Plant and Soren Hvalkof noted that when indigenous land tenure systems are recognized by the state, the recognition typically includes restrictions on the sale and transfer of land
to outsiders, precluding the use of land as collateral.' 40 Nevertheless, studies find active informal markets for land bound by these
Public Creationof PrivateProperty,in LAND AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 111 (R.E.
Downs & S.P. Reyna eds., 1988).
133. BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 19-20.
134. See Thirkell, supra note 127, at 79.
135. Id. tbl.3.
136. Id. at 79.
137. ALAN CARROLL, THE WORLD BANK, PIRATE SUBDIVSIONS AND THE MARKET FOR
RESIDENTIAL LoTS IN BOGOTA 11 (Urb. & Regl Econ. Div., Working Paper No. 435, 1980).
138. Id. at 41-43.
139. See, e.g., FARVACQUE & MCAUSLAN, supra note 11; GILBERT & WARD, supra note 12;
PAYNE, URBAN LAND TENURE, supra note 11, at 30-34; PIATrEAU, supra note 12.

140. PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 21, at 19. But see Stephen E. Hendrix, Property Law
Innovation in Latin America with Recommendations, 18 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REv. 1, 15-24
(1995) (discussing legislation in Nicaragua and Peru that removed restrictions on the sale and
transfer of land).
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restrictions, including rentals to outsiders.'" That said, Plant and
Hvalkof also find indigenous communities reluctant to rent their
land for fear of losing their rights, with the result that land is
left to very unproductive uses.4 2 The tension between wanting to
protect the integrity of communal areas and to avoid land consolidation by preventing transfers on the one hand, and productivity
concerns on the other hand, is a major cause of policy debate over
indigenous land rights.4
Contrary to our results from urban Ecuador, in a summary of
findings from studies of rural areas, Jean-Phillipe Platteau states
that greater security of tenure, including titling, does not tend
to facilitate transactions in rural land.'" The studies he examines
also suggest that where transactions do increase, the greater
market activity does not enhance efficiency, but is largely driven by
land speculation. 4"
VII. PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Legally secure ownership rights are expected to encourage
investment by increasing the demand and supply. On the demand
side, households are more willing to invest when they have greater
confidence that they will enjoy the fruits of that investment,
either directly or capitalized in greater sale or rental values. On the
supply side, investment is less costly if property can be mortgaged
and serve as collateral for formal loans. This Part considers
evidence regarding the aggregate effect of stronger rights on
investment and, when available, its source.
Lee Alston and his colleagues found a positive relationship
between whether a settler has title and investments in pasture
and permanent crops, taking account of the fact that title might
be endogenous. 1"6 Gershon Feder provided evidence from four
provinces in Thailand, where he compared titled and untitled
farmers in each region. In his survey context, whether a household
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 21, at 19.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 73.
See PLATrFAU, supra note 12, at 151-57.
Id. at 151.
See ALSTON ET AL., supra note 42, at 121-23, tbl.17.
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is titled depends on the allocation of land to forest reserves-land
within the reserves cannot be titled-and thus is not a choice that
is made by households.14 Further, although in principle farmers
could choose whether to locate in a titled or untitled area, in fact,
almost all land acquisition is through inheritance or marriage. 148
Thus, in the study region, title status is not endogenous. Controlling for many household and land characteristics, Feder found that
in three of the four provinces, titled farmers invest in higher levels
of inputs, including labor, and have higher yields per unit of land
than untitled farmers. 49 He suggested that credit access is the
main explanation.' s The one region where being titled did not
have a significant effect on farm productivity was also a region
with ample credit available from traders without the need for
collateral.' Thus, in this region there was less advantage to be
gained from having title.5 2
Timothy Besley formally modeled the three different reasons why
investment in land might be higher with stronger rights: the
longer-term opportunity to benefit from investments, the ability to
transfer and thus profit from investments via higher transactions
values, and greater access to credit."5 3 In the empirical analysis he
took account of the fact that rights over land may be endogenous
because households may choose to invest in order to strengthen
their property claims (these are usage and transfer rights not
4
necessarily related to title). 11
Using the technique described above,
he also used "instruments" to predict the rights variables as a
method to avoid statistical bias in the estimates.'55 Besley used
various details in the data, which came from a survey of farmers in
Ghana, to try to tease out which of the three reasons explain higher
investment by rural households with greater rights.5 6 In particu147. See Feder, supra note 42, at 22.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 25.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Timothy Besley, PropertyRights andInvestment Incentives: Theory andEvidence from
Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903, 906-07 (1995).
154. Id. at 912-19.
155. Id. at 907-19.
156. Id. at 906.
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lar, he noted that if rights matter to investment because they allow
better access to credit, then rights on a particular plot should not
matter if households have other land available that could be used
for collateral. 5 7 Overall there is evidence that a broader portfolio of8
5
rights over land is associated with greater private investment.
Further, there is some evidence that individual plot rights matter,
controlling for the holdings of the household, which suggests that
it is not improved credit access alone that explains the greater
incentive to invest. 5 9
Anne-Sophie Brasselle and her colleagues also used econometric
techniques to allow for the "simultaneous" nature of property rights
and investment (each causes the other) when estimating models of
the effect of rights on investment.'" Like Besley, they also found
that tenure security is strongly influenced by previous investments
in land.'' However, once this is taken into account, they did not
find evidence that stronger land rights stimulate further invest62
ment. 1

A study by Michael Carter and Pedro Olinto used another
approach to distinguish between demand (security) and supply
(credit) effects of property rights when examining investment
behavior by farmers in Paraguay. They showed in their sample that
titled properties receive more investment, and are associated with
greater credit, but also that they are larger properties." Thus, they
asked whether the higher levels of investment and credit are due
to the legal status of the properties, or rather their size (or another
factor such as farming zeal).' The study used a survey of households at two points in time, 1991 and 1994. Because they had two
pieces of information for the same household, they could measure
changes in investment resulting from changes in tenure status for
the same group of properties. In this way, the results controlled for
157. Id. at 916-17.
158. Id. at 926-27.
159. Id. at 927.
160. ANNE-SOPHIE BRASSELLE ETAL., LAND TENURE SECUITYAND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES:
FURTHER PUZZLING EVIDENCE FROM BURKINA FAsO 8-11, 17-21 (Centre de Recherche en
Economie de Ddvelopment, Working Paper No. 21, 1998).
161. Id. at 26-27, tbl.3.
162. Id. at 30.
163. See Carter & Olinto, supra note 74, at 183.
164. Id.
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all other household and property characteristics that might
otherwise have created an endogeneity problem. They found that
when households obtain formal rights, there is a strong and
significant positive effect on investment in the property. 6 5 However, for households that are estimated to remain credit-constrained, this is offset by a substantial decrease in other forms of
investment.'6 6 Thus, for credit-constrained households it is the
composition of investment that changes with title rather than the
amount of investment.
Another study made use of different types of land tenure in
Chinese villages to explore the effects of expropriation risk-lack
of tenure security-on private investment. 67 In this setting, local
leaders have the flexibility to reallocate public lands across
households periodically to promote both equity and efficiency. 68
This process is not closely related to choices made by households
and therefore an endogeneity concern in the study setting is
unlikely. 69 Security of tenure on some private plots is very high,
while other plots are rented on short contracts of uncertain
duration.1° Like the study by Besley in Ghana, the variation across
plots in the same area and cultivated by the same household,
together with the detail information in the survey data, allowed the
study to control well for differences that are not associated with
rights.
Using a 1995 World Bank household survey of 727 rural households from 31 villages, the study examined farmers' application of
organic fertilizer and chemical fertilizers.' 7 ' The first was longlasting and therefore a form of investment in the land. Chemical
fertilizers, on the other hand, last only one season. Using information on actual lengths of tenure, the researchers first estimated a
model of expropriation risk and used the results to predict risk for
each plot. They then examined whether farmers use different levels
of fertilizer on plots depending on the predicted risk of expropria165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Hanan G. Jacoby et al., Hazardsof Expropriation:Tenure Insecurityand Investment
in Rural China, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1420, 1420-21 (2002).
168. See id. at 1422.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 1423.
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tion.' 72 As hypothesized, they found that farmers use significantly
more organic fertilizer when security of tenure is higher, but that
their use of chemicals was the same on all plots.' 73 Further, for any
level of predicted tenure security, they found that households
reporting that they had been specifically assured by the village
cultivation of a
leadership that they would be allowed to continue
74
fertilizer.
organic
of
level
higher
plot invested a
The last result confirms the importance of signals of government
intentions in lowering tenure insecurity, above and beyond any
change in legal status. In another example, residents in Cairo
rejected title as too expensive, but considered the offer as a signal
of positive government intentions. This, with the 75provision of
services, led to a big increase in investment activity.
VIII. SOCIAL INVESTMENT
The idea that some communities are able to undertake collective
action more effectively than others has received a great deal of
attention in the development literature. The attribute of being able
to work cooperatively has been referred to as "social capital.' 7 6 One
of the central disputes in the social capital literature is where social
capital resides-whether it is inherent in a people or a culture or
whether it is the result of institutions. A key failing of the literaexogenous factors that
ture has been its inability to identify clearly
1 77
bring about the enhanced cooperation.
There is a budding empirical literature on the determinants
of social investment, though it is not as extensive as that on private investment. Jeff Dayton-Johnson, for example, explored the
determinants of communal participation in Mexican irrigation
projects. He found that social heterogeneity and landholding
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. at 1424.
Id. at 1438-39.
See Baharoglu, supranote 20, at 25 (citing Geoffrey Payne, Urban Land Tenure Policy

Options: Titles or Rights?, 25 HABITAT INT'L 415 (2001)).

176. There are a number of definitions of this term and serious arguments about whether
it is a useful concept. See Joel Sobel, Can We Trust Social Capital?,40 J. ECON. LiTERATURE
139 (2002) for a useful survey and review essay.
177. For a critique of empirical work on social capital, see generally Steven N. Durlauf, On
the Empirics of Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. 459 (2002).
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inequality significantly decrease maintenance work.' v Asim Ijaz
Khwaja studied the maintenance of public projects in Northern
Pakistan. He considered a range of community attributes, such as
the inequality of land distribution, the role of leadership, and social
homogeneity, and found that they have significant effects on
involvement in public work.'7 9 Neither work analyzes the effects of
property rights regimes.
The legal system governing property rights certainly suggests
itself as one candidate for a policy that could enhance cooperation
within a community and social investment. As with private investment, residents who feel their membership in the community
to be more secure may be more willing to undertake communal
activities, since they are more likely to reap the gains.' ° On the
other hand, the alternative systems that can substitute for a formal
property rights regime may themselves foster cooperation. As
indicated in Table 4, there is a substantial amount of communal
activity in our surveyed neighborhoods, particularly in Quito. The
need for cooperation may diminish as a community is formalized.
One of the reasons for cooperative lobbying efforts by informal
residents, for example, is precisely to obtain recognition and
infrastructure services.'' The relationship between this activity
and the structure of property rights promises to be a fruitful area
of future research.

178. Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Determinantsof Collective Action on the Local Commons: A
Model with Evidence from Mexico, 62 J. DEv. ECON. 181, 182 (2000).
179. See Asim Ijaz Khwaja, Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Communities? Collective
Action in Public Good Provision (2002) (mimeograph, Harvard, Kennedy School of
Government) (copy on file with authors). His principal finding is that project attributes can
successfully substitute for community attributes. For example, a less complex project design
could compensate for community heterogeneity.
180. See Kevin R. Cox, Housing Tenure and NeighborhoodActivism, 18 URB. AFF. Q. 107
(1982) (presenting evidence from the United States that owners are more likely to engage in
neighborhood activism than renters, controlling for a variety of characteristics).
181. See BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 40, for an interesting account of the political
activities of members of irregular settlements in Delhi.
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Table 4
The Creation and Maintenance of Local Public Goods
Surveyed Households' Contribution of Time and Money (%)

Activity
Lobbying

Guayaquil
Time
Money
3.2

Time

Quito
Money

29.0

Government

Road Work

5.8

6.0

28.1

7.0

Cleaning
Meeting

0.5

0.5

7.5

12.4

1.0

2.8

13.3

6.5

Area

Cleaning
Park

Collecting

38.8

54.0

Rubbish
Any Activity

42.0

8.8

72.2

16.2

Note: Other activities include building security walls on slopes,
filling in land under houses built over water, and maintaining
community water taps.

IX. ACCESS TO FORMAL CREDIT
Erica Field noted that four separate studies of urban households
titled under the COFOPRI program in Peru failed to find a
significant effect on residents' access to business credit.18 2 Further,
when interviewed, small business owners expressed an unwillingness to mortgage their properties, particularly for sizable loans,
182. See Field, supra note 43, at 21.
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because of the risk of loss.'83 Formal financial institutions are
rarely found to use or even accept small titled plots as collateral.'8 4
The costs and difficulties of foreclosing on such properties are high
relative to the low profitability of the loans.8 5 The only bank willing
to give credit to newly formalized settlements titled by COFOPRI
was the Banco de Materiales,which is also under the Ministry of
the Presidency.'86 A quarter of these loans were said to have defaulted, with the suggestion that since the land under COFOPRI
was free, residents consider that the building loan should also be

free. 187
Jean-Phillipe Platteau highlighted the same two reasons why
credit effects may be muted in his survey of studies in rural

Africa.' Smallholders are reluctant to put their land at risk as
collateral, and land is often not viewed as desirable collateral by
credit institutions because it is difficult to foreclose and dispose of
in the market.'89 The judicial system may not support foreclosure
and the community may make it impossible."9 Parker Shipton says
of Kenya, "the presence of many kin around mortgaged land makes
it politically infeasible to auction the holdings of defaulters."' 91
In Egypt, banks have not accepted occupied residential property as collateral on loans because the eviction of inhabitants was
illegal.'92 However, the evidence is clearly mixed and there is
some indication that lenders can become interested in titling as a
way to create better collateral. In Lima, for example, KARPA S.A.,
a construction company that sells housing supplies on credit to
titled households in invaded areas, has donated material, computers, and salaries to government agencies involved in the titling and
registration of squatter communities in order to accelerate the
process for would-be customers.'93
183. Id. at 22-23.
184. See Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 18 box 7.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 18-19.
187. See Kagawa & Turkstra, supra note 32, at 68.
188. See PLATFEAU, supra note 12, at 144-45.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 145.
191. See Shipton, supra note 132, at 120.
192. See David Sims, What is Secure Tenure in Urban Egypt?, in LAND, RIGHTS AND
INNOVATION, supra note 32, at 77, 97.
193. See LASTARRIA-CORNHIEL & BARNES, supra note 28, at 21.

2004]

COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK FOR TITLING PROGRAMS

935

In the study of Thai farmers described above, Gershon Feder and
his colleagues also found that titled farmers obtain significantly
more formal credit than untitled farmers. 94 The authors, however,
make the important point that, to the extent that interest rates
are lower from formal credit institutions because of government
subsidies, the benefit of title in increasing access to formal credit
is overvalued by property holders relative to its social benefit.'95
This is because the private beneficiary does not take into account
the cost of the subsidy.' Using a number of assumptions about
risk aversion, the divergence between the opportunity cost of
capital and the formal interest rate, credit supply, and probabilities
of eviction in their four Thai provinces, the authors calculated that
the gross social benefit of titling is at most half of the private
value. 197
X. PROPERTY TAX TO FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE

One benefit to the government of formalizing land ownership is
the expansion of the property tax base. This should either allow for
lower tax rates or for new provision of public services, financed by
the new revenue.
A World Bank completion report for a title registration project
in Thailand during the mid-1980s found that the net increase in
tax and fee collections was 14% to 278% higher in areas with the
project. 198 Although a higher incidence of taxation may seem disadvantageous to property holders, it may well be to their advantage
if the property taxes are actually used to improve services. Jesko
Hentschel and Peter Lanjouw, for example, indicate that in the
Costa region of Ecuador, the location of Guayaquil, only 62% of
households in urban areas had access to the public water supply,
with an estimated 17% reliant on tankers.' 9 They emphasize that
194. See FEDER ET AL., supra note 97, at 44-45.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 67.
198. See Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 16. It is not clear from the reference what the
baseline .is.
199. JESKO HENTSCHEL & PETER LANJOUW, HOUSEHOLD WELFARE MEASUREMENT AND THE
PRICING OF BASIC SERVICES 1, 7 & tbl.1 (World Bank Working Paper No. 2006, 1998), at
http'//econ.worldbank.org/docs/233.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
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expenditures on tanker water, primarily by the poor, far exceeded
expenditures by households drawing water from the municipal
system.2°
Just as construction companies have an interest in formalization
as a way to develop collateral for home improvement loans, utilities
have an interest in formalization if it helps them to provide
services that are otherwise tapped illegally. It was pressure from
the electricity company in Rio de Janeiro that pushed the local
authorities to give street and unit numbers to properties in the
informal favelas (a process called "addressage). 20 '
XI. TITLING COSTS: EVIDENCE FROM ECUADOR
In our survey, we asked each household that had obtained title
how long it had taken to obtain title and the cost of doing so.
Squatter households without title were asked to provide estimates
of what these values would be, as were respondents for the community questionnaire. We restricted our attention to Guayaquil and
to the sample of 142 households providing estimates, so as not to
combine inconsistent data. 2 Summary statistics of the responses
are in Panel A of Table 5.
The first two columns in Panel A give sample statistics for the
number of months it was expected to take to obtain title. Although
anecdotal evidence suggests that titling may take a very long time,
the median values given by the households and thirteen community
respondents are similar and quite short: six and four months,
respectively.0 3 There is, however, considerable variation in views
among the household respondents, ranging from zero to almost
200. Id.
201. See Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 20.
202. The actual, historical figures are substantially larger than those estimated by untitled
households. There are two reasons for thinking that this is an artifact of our incorrect
adjustment for inflation. First, the timing of payments was not known precisely and had to
be estimated. Second, some of the respondents may have converted to current values in giving

their responses, making our conversion to 1996 an overadjutment. Durations over fifteen
years and costs over $500 were treated as outliers and deleted from the data presented here.
This removed one household for each question.
203. Obtaining title requires that the property be surveyed, that title be approved by the
Directorate of Properties and Parroquial Services, signed by the Director of Properties, the
Chief of Legalization of Parcels, the Municipal Secretary, and the Mayor, and then registered
in the cadastre by the Department of Urbanization, Valuation and Registry.
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fifteen years. The bottom two rows of Panel A indicate how many
of the respondents answered zero, and give the mean after dropping
these respondents.
The third and fourth columns of Panel A give the same information, but for estimates of the cost of titling. Including the twentynine households who expect titling to be costless, the mean value
is $44 with a median of $29. Again, there is considerable variation,
from zero to $286. The community respondents demonstrate a
similar variation in estimates, although they tend to be more
sanguine about costs overall with a mean estimate of $29 and a
median of $11. In this case, dropping the zeros has a noticeable
effect on the mean, and is probably appropriate since the municipality does charge households for the land when it is titled, as well
as a small ($0.71) administrative fee. The official cost of an average
plot, not including payments to lawyers, and other expenses, ranges
from $1.30 to $29.30, depending on the community. 0 4 Our figures
are consistent with the fees reported by the municipality. They are
also close to titling costs reported in 1995 by Lee Alston and his
colleagues for a small sample of seven squatters in rural Para,
Brazil. "° Estimates of the total costs of obtaining title, including
the opportunity cost of time, ranged from $12 to $60, with a median
value of $24 (1992 U.S. dollars).

204. Interview with Ab. Jose Javier Varas Calvo, M.I. Municipalidad de Guayaquil, in
Guayaquil, Ecuador (Mar. 1996).
205. Lee J. Alston et al., PropertyRights and the Preconditionsfor Markets: The Case ofthe
Amazon Frontier,151 J. INSTITLUTONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 89, 101-02 (1995).
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Panel B of Table 5 presents regression results that help explain
some of the large variation in the estimates of the duration and cost
of titling reported by households (although the R 2's indicate that
much of the variation remains unexplained). Squatters in more
distant communities expect to face dramatically lower costs of
titling. A one standard deviation increase in the distance from the
city center lowers expected costs by 90%. A striking finding is the
importance in the titling process of whether the land invaded was
originally privately or publicly owned. Squatters on private land
expect titling to be both much faster (by almost two years), and
much more expensive (a 100% increase in price). Contrary to what
one might expect, the fact that there was resistance during an
invasion does not suggest to squatters that titling will take more
time, and further, it lowers their estimate of costs. When the
municipality is running a titling program in a community, this
naturally lowers the residents' expectations about how long it will
take to get a title, although it does not lower the costs. Finally, we
see from the coefficient on the size of the property that the costs of
titling increase with lot size. A 10% increase in square meters,
however, increases expected costs by just 5%, indicating that there
are large economies of scale with relatively higher costs faced by
the smaller property owners. None of the variables related to the
activities of community organizers, or to household characteristics,
were significant determinants of the expected duration, or costs, of
titling.
XII. DYNAMIC AND DISTRIBUTIONAL
Whatever the final net benefits of having urban households
reside on legally titled properties rather than in irregular settlements, the process of moving from one situation to the other can be
costly. While the position of some groups is improved when a tenure
system changes, others often lose out. As a result, the process can
be corrupt and the source of violent class and ethnic conflict." 6
206. See Donald A. Krueckeberg & Kurt G. Paulsen, Evaluating the Experience of

Brazilian,South African and Indian Urban Tenure Programmes,in HOLDING THEIR GROUND,
supra note 7, at 233, 241. CITIES, supra note 84, at 19-21, summarizes the multiple sources
of conflict found to impede efforts to regularize settlements in a series of case studies. These
include disputes between: landowners and occupants, occupants and developers and

940

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:889

In 1985, Brazil initiated land reform through the expropriation
of private farms and settlement of households.2"' Lee Alston and
his colleagues investigated the relationships over time between
the activities of the implementing agency and the level of violent
conflict between settlers and landowners.2" 8 They argue that violence increases the political pressure on the agency to find a
solution by expropriating the land and officially settling the
squatters, and that this response is recognized by all parties
involved.0 9 They then point to the fact that there can be a counterproductive dynamic effect whereby the success of previous violence
in conveying rights to squatters increases the likelihood of more
violence.2 10 This dynamic is supported by data for municipios over
time: the number of settlements is positively related to past
conflicts, and the level of current conflicts is related to past
settlements.2 1 ' Thus, they conclude that while political pressure for
land reform has been motivated by a desire to decrease violence,
the demonstration effect of expropriation in favor of violent
invaders has had the opposite effect.212
In their discussion of indigenous peoples and land titling
experience in Latin America, Roger Plant and Soren Hvalkof
emphasize that one of the hurdles confronting the clarification of
land rights to increase security has been the fact that, historically,
different groups often have been given claims over the same
areas. 213 In particular, conflict and difficult political pressures arise
in situations with overlapping claims by indigenous groups and
non-indigenous settlers (e.g., mineral extraction companies).2 14
They note that, without support, the indigenous people tend to lose
out and that titling programs thus should make a point to survey

municipal authorities, local leaders and elected officials, and occupants and those running the
formalization program.
207. See ALSTON ET AL., supra note 42, at 90-95, 153-58.
208. Id. at 92-95.
209. Id. at 155, 166.
210. Id. at 155-58.
211. Id. at 166-67 tbl.26.
212. Id. at 176-77.
213. See PLANT & HVALKOF, supra note 21, at 8, 41.
214. Id. at 42.
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and title first the lands held by indigenous groups before moving
15
on.

2

Jean-Phillipe Platteau also highlights situations in African
countries where weaker members of society have lost rights during
changes in the system of rules governing rural land ownership.2 1 6
He concludes from his survey that "clever, well-informed or powerful (and usually educated) individuals often successfully jockey to
have parcels not previously theirs registered in their own name
while the mass of rural people are generally unaware of the new
land provisions or do not grasp the implications of registration."2 17
The experience of women has received some attention. Susana
Lastarria-Cornhiel gives an overview of women's rights over land
under customary tenure systems in Africa, and how these change
as rights are individualized and privatized (which may or may not
be due to a land titling program).2 18 In surveying the literature, she
notes several important problems. First, under customary systems
several individuals and community members might have rights
over a plot.21 9 Women typically would not have ownership rights but
might have rights to cultivate and claim parts of the output from
certain plots. 220 With privatization, all rights tend to be pulled
together under the control of one person. 22 ' Typically, it is the male
household head that receives title for the land occupied by the
family.22 2 Women's rights in land tend to be derived from their
relationships with male relatives and therefore are not well suited
to serve as the basis for a legal claim over a parcel.223 In addition,
she notes that it is not uncommon for weaker households to lose out
to powerful men during the process of formalization, as the latter
put newly formalized land in their own names. 224 Finally, she gives
215. Id. In Colombia, indigenous lands were specifically excluded from land titling
programs to ensure that individualized titling would not affect recognized communal land
area. Id. at 54-55.
216. See PLArrEAU, supra note 12, at 166.
217. Id.
218. Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact of Privatizationon Gender and PropertyRights in
Africa, 25 WoRLD DEV. 1317, 1319 (1997).
219. See id.
220. See id. at 1320.
221. See id. at 1319.
222. See id. at 1326; see also PLArrEAU, supranote 12 (discussing examples in rural Africa).
223. See Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 218, at 1323.
224. See id. at 1325.
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examples of how the bias against giving women legal control over
formalized property may manifest itself in practice even when there
is no bias in the law."2 Discrimination in favor of men may not be
overt but may arise from other requirements of6 land ownership,
22
such as the need to show regular employment.
With forethought, titling programs can be designed to avoid
negative distributional outcomes. For example, in a slum upgrading
project in New Delhi, India, the government offered residents
title in 1989 after a decade of having their homes regularly
demolished. 221 Most of the men demanded title in their names but
the government refused, fearing that the men would sell out and
move their families on to another slum. Instead, they titled the
women in the community. This seems to have been successful
because few of the households left the community after receiving
title. The state of Andhra Pradesh in India had an extensive
program to grant housing sites (pattas) to urban households.2 2 8
Households became eligible after living five years on government
land. 22 9 The rights can be inherited but cannot be alienated, the lots
can be used for housing mortgages, and the government can grant
title in the name of women. 3 0
Donald Krueckeberg and Kurt Paulsen indicate, without giving
details, that in organized communities where women dominate the
local committees, there are lower turnover rates.2"' The authors
ascribe this to women being more likely to value building a longterm and secure home and less inclined to sell out as property
prices rise with formalization." 2 Those concerned about its impact
on the availability of housing for the poor call this process "downward raiding."2 3
225. See id. at 1326.
226. See, e.g., Saad S. Yahya, The CertificateofRights Story in Botswana,in LAND, RIGHTS
AND INNOVATION, supra note 32, at 193, 200-02 (discussing gender discrimination in land
ownership in Botswana).
227. See John Stackhouse, Women Key to India's Urban Slum Renewal, TORONTO GLOBE
& MAIL, Sept. 9, 1996, at Al.
228. See Banashree Banerjee, Security of Tenure in Indian Cities, in HOLDING THEIR
GROUND, supra note 7, at 37, 47.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 47.
231. Krueckeberg & Paulsen, supra note 206, at 241.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 240-41.
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Similarly, Platteau notes that in order to avoid disputes over the
loss of land, public authorities in Kenya have required the agreement of family members, including women, prior to any titleholder
using land as collateral." 4 He refers to a proposal in Zimbabwe to
give farmers rights to their land, but the proposal required the
traditional village council's approval for transactions.2 35 He
concludes that to prevent conflicts, "the state has decided to retreat
from the most radical interpretation of freehold tenure and to
revert to some customary principles of land allocation."" 6
XIII. PROPERTY PRICE REGRESSIONS

A. Evidence from Ecuador
The standard approach to quantifying the value conferred to
owners by a particular property right is to compare the sale value
of a property with a similar property that does not have that right
associated with it. We have emphasized that the market price of a
property reflects both the value of owning the property as well as
the buyer's confidence that the seller will honor the purchase.237
When title formalizes ownership, this confidence increases and the
expected value of purchasing the property increases. For homeowners with no plans to sell, the increased confidence in transactions
conferred by formalization has little value, and thus, this component of the price increase does not correspond to an increase in
their well-being. Because formalization changes the value of
property ownership and the degree of transactions uncertainty,
both must be considered when interpreting price changes as a
measure of the welfare gain associated with formal property rights.
There are also statistical difficulties associated with valuing
rights in this way. These difficulties arise from the problem of
identifying groups of titled and untitled properties that are similar
in all respects besides title status. Some qualities of a property that
affect its value are not captured in data, and household decisions
234. See PLATrEAu, supra note 12, at 153 (citing Shipton, supra note 132).
235. Id.
236. Id.

237. See Lanjouw & Levy, supra note 13, for a theoretical model of these relationships and
further discussion.
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about whether to obtain a title may be systematically related to
some of these unobservable characteristics. That is, we have the
now familiar problem of endogeneity leading to biased estimates of
the value of title.
To avoid this problem, we designed our survey to adopt an
alternative approach. For each household that claimed it was able
to sell its property, we asked the respondent to give an estimated
sale value. Among this group, the owners of untitled properties
were then asked the price they thought they could obtain in a sale
of their property if it were in a titled state, and vice versa for the
titled property owners. Thus, each property enters the analysis
in both a titled and untitled state and we can estimate "within
respondent" changes in expected sale prices with title. The analysis
includes only the fifty-one households that said that they would be
able to sell in both titled and untitled states.
The unconditional expected mean effect of titling a property in
Guayaquil is to raise its expected sale price by an estimated 23.5%.
Part of this increase simply reflects the buyers' willingness to pay
more when a transaction takes place with the added certainty of
formalization. The increase should thus be seen as an upper bound
on the gain in utility derived from ownership of the property.
In our more restricted data for Quito, we do not have data on
hypothetical states and therefore cannot follow this approach.
However, we do estimate conventional hedonic price regressions
which capture the value of title while controlling for a wide range
of property characteristics. Remarkably, the overall estimated
effect of going from an untitled to titled state is to raise the price by
a very similar 21.3%. The regression coefficients in Table 6 indicate
the extent to which the indicated variable enhances or diminishes
the effect of title on sale value.
In the first group of variables, we again see the substitution
between different sources of property claims. Both community age
and the fact that many households paid a boss make title significantly less important. The age of the community is particularly
influential. The impact of title is 45% lower in a community which
has been in existence for fourteen years (the mean) than it is in a
community just after its establishment. The impact of title is 9%
lower in communities where one-third of the households paid a boss
(again, the mean) than in a community where none of the squatters
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paid a boss. The fact that official institutions such as courts and
judges are resolving disputes in the community (formal enforcement) strongly reduces the importance of title in raising property
values. This could be an indicator of the extent to which property
boundaries are settled and recognized.23 8
Turning to the second group of variables, which are indicators of
nontransferable ownership claims, we see that all of them dampen
the effect of title on price (in point estimate).

238. This is also inconsistent with evidence from the Amazon region of Brazil presented in
ALSTON ETAL., supra note 42, at 116. In estimates of the extent to which formal title increases
land values, they find a sharply diminishing effect as one moves away from market centers.
Id.
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Table 6
Effect of Title on Property Valuea
Variable
constant

Coefficient
1.86

S.E.b

n(age)
distance
percent paid boss (community)
formal enforcement

-0.17
0.04
-0.26
-0.28

0.07
0.01
0.12
0.08

paid boss (household)
In(years resident)
In(assets)
education > primary
adult males
males*ln(yrs resident)

0.00
-0.16
-0.05
-0.04
-0.63
0.24

0.06
0.09
0.04
0.07
0.21
0.08

R2
Sample Mean Expected Change (s.d.)
Predicted Change in
Value from Title
40.9%
24.5
16.0
24.1

0.55

0.67
23.5% (5.0)

Adult Males
No
No

Years of
Residence
5
14 (mean)

Yes
Yes

5
14

Notes: aThe dependent variable is the value (in logs) that a household
believes it could obtain for its property if it is titled minus the value (in logs)
if it is untitled. The inverse Mills ratio is included to allow for the restriction
of the sample to households who indicate that they can sell in both states.
Weighted least squares estimates allow for heteroscedasticity across communities.
bS.E. are estimated robust standard errors. Bold typeface indicates a
0.10 significance level.
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In particular, the coefficients on years of residence and the
presence of a male are statistically significant. Households with
only women and children gain a vastly greater price increase from
title than households with adult males. Figures given at the bottom
of the table indicate that, at sample means, the expected sale value
of a property owned by a female-only household in a newly
established neighborhood increases 41% with title.
B. Evidence from Elsewhere
In our study from Ecuador, we controlled for the characteristics
of properties by asking households to answer hypothetical questions about value in different states. A survey of households in Peru
obtained similarly controlled and perception-based estimates of
the effect of title by asking households whether their properties
had increased in value over a specified period. Of those households
with a title from the COFOPRI program, 75% indicated that their
property had increased in value, whereas about 70% of those
households with another form of title indicated an increase in
value. Only 39% of untitled owners indicated that their property
had increased in value.2 39
Our estimates for Ecuador are comparable to the effect of title
found in hedonic price equations using urban data from Manila and
Davao, Philippines. In these cities, being titled was estimated to
raise the value of property by 18% and 58%, respectively.2"
Acknowledging that the value of title may vary with the strength
of informal rights, the authors interacted title with the age of the
dwelling to allow for the fact that older units might be "de facto"
secure from eviction. Their results, like ours, support this contention. They do not, however, explore any other features of communities that might affect property rights. As in our study of Ecuador,
they find that household characteristics affect the price premium
associated with title, but their rationale for this finding is different
from ours. Using a model in which households chose their location,
they showed that household characteristics are endogenous because
239. See Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 17 box 6.
240. See Joseph Friedman et al., The Demand for Tenure Security in Developing Countries,
29 J. DEV. ECON. 185, 197-98 (1988); Emmanuel Jimenez, Tenure Security and Urban
Squatting, 66 REv. ECON. & STAT. 556, 565-66 (1984).

948

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:889

they may become associated with unobservable variation in
community-level risk of eviction as a result of these location
choices. By contrast, in our model, a change in household characteristics alters informal rights and therefore changes the risk of
eviction. Rather than richer households choosing areas where title
is less important, title is less important because they are rich
households and can assert their rights without having title. It is not
possible to distinguish between these two interpretations of the
effect of household characteristics on value with only the results of
hedonic price regressions. The more detailed look at households'
abilities to transact in different markets discussed in the preceding
Parts demonstrates that household characteristics may, in fact, be
determinants of informal rights and thus the risk associated with
property ownership. In a study done in Jakarta, Indonesia, parcels
with registered title had more than a 50% price premium in the
central business district and, even in more distant areas, the
premium remained over 20%.21
Terry Anderson and Dean Lueck examined the effect of differences in the form of legal ownership on the productive value of
land on Indian reservations in the United States.242 Reservation
land is held in three main tenures: fee simple, individual trust, and
tribal trust. 23 A variety of important constraints are associated
with leasing and transferring trust lands or with using them as
collateral-problems that are particularly acute under the tribal
form. 2 " They estimate the 1987 gross agricultural output per acre
of land on thirty-nine Indian reservations separately for each of the
three forms of tenure. 245 Differences can be due to differences in
investment, for either demand or supply reasons, or differences in
usage.246 In particular, constraints on rental and sale of trust lands
may cause land to be left fallow. 2 47 Econometric estimates find
241. See Baharoglu, supra note 20, at 16. There is no discussion of endogeneity, so these
figures may be biased by a relationship between value and a characteristic affecting the
decision to title property.
242. See Terry L. Anderson & Dean Lueck, Land Tenure and AgriculturalProductivity on
Indian Reservations, 35 J.L. & ECON. 427, 427-28 (1992).
243. See id. at 428-29.
244. Id. at 430-31.
245. Id. at 439-40, 442-43.
246. Id. at 443-44.
247. Id. at 448.
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strong effects of tenure with tribal trusts and individual trusts
reducing the value of output per acre by 85-90% and 30-40%,
respectively, relative to output on fee simple land.2
CONCLUSION

We cannot conclude this paper with a blanket statement that
titling programs are beneficial or harmful. There is substantial
variation in the likely benefits of replacing an informal property
rights regime with a formal one. There is also likely to be substantial variation across households and communities in the
distributional consequences of a program, depending on issues such
as the gender of land occupants and the amount of time they have
occupied the property.
Instead, this paper offers a framework for addressing these
issues. Through household survey data, it is possible to quantify
the potential effects of titling on the ability to transact, the ability
to obtain credit, and the propensity to invest in one's property and
in one's community. Such empirical estimations must be undertaken with care, since disregard for statistical problems such as
endogeneity may result in misleading estimates. The studies described above, however, offer examples of how such hurdles can be
overcome.
There is still substantial work to be done if we are to get a more
general picture of the costs and benefits of titling. Certain countries
have been well studied-Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, and Ghana, for
example-but given the diversity of practices in each country, one
must exercise caution in imputing findings from these cases to the
rest of the developing world. Further, even in these countries, there
are some critical components that are not well understood. The cost
to the government of implementing a titling system is one prominent example.

248. Id. at 448. The authors consider whether land tenure arrangements might be
endogenous, that is, fee simple land might be better quality land in ways that are not
controlled in the estimations. They argue on the basis of historical allocation, and other
considerations, that the current status of a particular piece of land is unlikely to be related
to current productivity. Further, data available on land quality indicates that if there is a
difference it is the trust land that is of higher quality. Id. at 443-46.
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Finally, even after a careful empirical study provides good
estimates of various costs and benefits, the decision of whether to
undertake a titling program ultimately may depend on value
judgments. If the program benefits the poor occupants, but hurts a
wealthy landholder, how are these effects weighed against one
another?2 49
There is good reason to believe that a formal system of property
rights can spur economic growth. The question that policy analysis
must address on a case-by-case basis is whether the potential net
benefits are such that titling takes priority over the many other
needs of developing countries.

249. One common approach is to weigh all such effects equally and assume that if the sum
is positive, then beneficiaries could compensate those who lose. The likelihood that such
compensation would ever be paid is a serious question, however.
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Appendix Table A.1
Selected Variables: Survey of Property Rights in Guayaquil
Invasion resisted

If community settled with an invasion, I if

Private land

resisted; 0 if not
If community settled with an invasion,
I if squatted on privately owned property; 0
if on public land

Ownership document
Paid boss (household)
Percent paid boss (community)

Adult males
Ln(assets)

Per-capita consumption
Age of household head
Education > primary
Formal enforcement

Distance

Ln(years resident)
Ln(lot size)
Title
Ln(age)
Community boss
Government titling program

1 if household has some type of ownership
document other than a formal title; 0 else
1 if household reports making payments to a
boss; 0 else
Percent of respondent households who are
squatters and who also report making payments to a boss that were not for the property itself
1 if household has a male from 18-65; 0 else
Log of household wealth - 24 household assets valued at estimated current condition
replacement value. Here and following:
$1=3500 sucres at time of survey
Per-capita consumption calculated from
LSMS-style detailed listing of components
Age of household head
1 if education of household head is greater
than primary; 0 else
1 if household indicates that courts, judges
or the municipality settle land disputes; 0
else
Estimated distance of the community from
the telephone company (located in central
Guayaquil)
Log of years that household has been resident on current property
Log of square meters of property
1 if household has a title to property; 0 else
Log of years since the first settlement of
community
If community settled with an invasion,
1 if there was an organizer involved; 0 else
1 if government actively promoting titling in
community in past 2 years; 0 else

